

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday 22 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

(Canada)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO
Mr. J. MACHADO LOPES
Mr. E. M. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. A. E. GOTTLIEB
Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Idj Mikael IMRU
Abc M. GIEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL
Mr. A. S. MEHTA
Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Baron C. H. von PLATEN

Mr. S. LOFGREN

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. P. F. SHAKHOV

Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN

Mr. M. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. E. IBRAHIM

PRÉSENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODBER
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. D. N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. C. C. STELLE
Mr. A. L. RICHARDS
Mr. D. E. MARK
Mr. R. A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the one hundred and twenty-third plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): During recent meetings of this Committee -- I have in mind particularly those of 10 April (ENDC/FV.120) and 17 April (ENDC/FV.121) -- some pessimistic assessments of the results of our work at this Conference were voiced, and an unwanted wind of anxiety passed amongst us.

There are, of course, sound reasons for such phenomena. We have been working so long already, and we still have not secured the results expected the world over. Since the resumption of our proceedings on 12 February we have not moved matters perceptibly further; we have not reached even one specific partial agreement in any area.

At first sight, that is the state of affairs, and it might naturally cause pessimism and anxiety. But if we look into the depth of the matters, if we go into the inner process which their essence has undergone, we find other aspects too which, on the one hand, lead us to note that our efforts have not been altogether in vain and, on the other hand, deserve our utmost attention having in mind the future development of the situation.

In order to illustrate this view of the Romanian delegation, may I refer to the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests -- an area where we are faced with exceptionally serious and complex obstacles.

We all remember that there was a time when the Western delegations, in discussing underground tests, stated categorically that the basic element of a control system must be international stations and inspections, without any store being set by the national stations. Experience has shown that that point of view not only does not help in reaching a common stand but has not even been borne out by reality.

During our negotiations, during the cross-fire of theses and arguments, science and technique have made such progress that now the unanimous conclusion has been reached that the contrary point of view is the right one: in other words, that the basic element of the verification system must be the national stations.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

That is what renowned Western scientists say; it is what Senators in the United States Congress are saying; and, finally it is what has been said in our Committee by the leader of the United States delegation. Mr. Stelle stated on 22 February 1963:

"The Soviet representative talked about three things, in the main. First, he talked about reliance on national systems. Now it is clear that there is no issue between us on a system which puts its basic reliance on nationally-manned detection systems. We of the West have moved on this. We called for a network of international systems, internationally manned and staffed. Later we moved from that to willingness to agree to a system of nationally-manned stations under international supervision. Most recently we have agreed to place our reliance on national systems checked by various kinds of instrumentation, and without international supervision. So there is no issue on this, ..." (ENDC/FV.101, p.42)

In fact, there is no issue on it; so let us consider it as an attained asset, a common asset, an asset of all of us, obtained as a result of long and difficult negotiations.

That is not all. We remember that there was a time when the Western delegations claimed that underground nuclear explosions below a certain magnitude could not be detected and identified by national means. Experience has shown that that point of view was not supported by reality and that the claim could not be upheld ad infinitum. Even the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, had to acknowledge openly that:

"The increase in our technical ability to detect seismic events at long distances" -- here Mr. Rusk is referring to the ability of the United States -- "permits us to rely upon seismic stations outside the Soviet Union to detect underground nuclear explosions inside the Soviet Union". (Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations -- United States Senate, 33th Congress, 11 March, 1963, p.7).

In the United States -- as, by the way, in other countries too -- substantial progress has been made in the detection of underground explosions. For instance, today it is thought that the possibility of detecting nuclear explosions from a great

distance is better than the possibility of detecting the same explosions from a shorter distance. That view has been clearly expressed in a document drawn up by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I have in mind the "Critique of the scientific assertions of Representative Craig Hosmer in his letter of March 18 to President John F. Kennedy", which has been reproduced in the Congressional Record of 21 March 1963, p. 4503. In that document we read:

"The fact is that detection at distances greater than 620 miles is frequently better than that at 620 miles. Indeed, a 1961 study made by two scientists from AEC's Livermore Laboratory and one from the Rand Corporation shows that the signal from a 1-kiloton shot in soft rock (tuff) at about 1,200 miles is over twice as high as the signal is at 620 miles. At either distance, the signal was strong enough for detection. A graph showing conclusions from this study has been given to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

"Another graph submitted to the Joint Committee by Defense Department Scientist Jack P. Ruina shows that while detection capability decreases from about 1,000 to 2,000 miles, it increases again from 2,000 to 3,000 miles. Throughout the range from about 600 to 6,000 miles, modern multielement detection stations would have a high probability of detecting nuclear explosions down to 1 or 2 kilotons in soft rock (tuff). As a matter of fact, two relatively simple seismic stations located 2,000 and 2,500 miles from our Nevada test site detected most of the shots equivalent to about 1 kiloton in soft rock. Improved equipment at these two stations would have permitted detection of even smaller explosions".

So there is no issue on that either. We have always said that, thanks to technological progress, underground nuclear explosions could be detected at great distances by national means. That is now acknowledged also by political leaders and scientists in the United States. Consequently that, too, is an acquired asset -- secured, equally, as a result of long and difficult negotiations.

And that is not all. We remember that there was a time when the Western delegations contested the thesis that for the parties to a test ban treaty to be safeguarded against the risk implied by the possibility of clandestine underground nuclear tests it would not be necessary that every underground explosion below a certain level should be detected and identified, but that it would be sufficient if there were firm assurance of the detection of any series of underground nuclear explosions. Now, a series of nuclear explosions cannot escape modern capabilities of detection, and detecting a series means identifying it as such.

As time went on the United States Government, confronted by incontestable evidence had to alter its views and to admit that to avoid the danger of underground nuclear explosions being continued by one of the parties the detection of a series of nuclear explosions and not of every separate event would suffice. That point of view, which was expressed in this Committee by the socialist delegations many months ago, was acknowledged by the President of the United States in his Press conference of 6 March 1963. Mr. Kennedy said:

"I believe we will insist upon a test-ban treaty which gives us assurance that if any country conducted a series of clandestine underground tests that series would be detected."

On what grounds did Mr. Kennedy make that statement, asking for assurance of the detection of a series and not of every single event? The answer is given by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:

"There is always the possibility of a threshold under which detection would be difficult, certainly on any isolated single test. One must always have in mind that it is unlikely that any single test will make any substantial difference in the strategic balance."

"It is also unlikely that any series of tests will fail of detection with modern methods which we believe are dependable".

That is quoted from the report of hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services -- United States Senate, 87th Congress, 17, 18 and 19 September 1962, page 51.

Consequently, there is no issue on that point either. Authorities of high responsibility in the United States have acknowledged that, in order to control whether a party signatory to the treaty continued to carry out underground nuclear weapon tests, it would be necessary to detect not every single explosion but only a series of explosions. That is one more asset secured as a result of negotiations.

Again that is not all. We remember that for a long time the Western delegations have tried to argue that the verification system cannot be efficient unless it includes on-site inspections. The socialist delegations have argued the contrary point of view and they remain convinced that it is possible to set up a very efficient verification system without on-site inspections. Notwithstanding that, and in order to remove the last obstacle from the path leading to the conclusion of a test ban treaty, the Government of the Soviet Union has accepted two to three on-site inspections (ENDC/73, p.5). On the one hand, that decision is of a strictly political nature and, on the other hand, it gives additional assurance of control to a system which was already sufficient to ensure the implementation of the treaty provisions.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

The Western delegations have claimed, and keep claiming, that two to three inspections per annum are not sufficient, and they ask for seven. (ENDC/78, p.1) . There is no scientific basis for such a requirement. That has been made abundantly clear in this Committee. But now nine United States scientists, whose authority in merito is beyond contest, come and confirm that three inspections are sufficient as an additional assurance.

In a recent statement published on 9 April 1963 in The Washington Post, Dr. Bernard Feld, Dr. David Inglis, Dr. James Watson, Dr. Bruno Rossi, Dr. Donald Glaser, Dr. Hans Bethe, Dr. Freeman Dyson, Dr. Francis Low and Dr. K.T. Bainbridge say, inter alia

"We have additional assurances in the fact that the Soviet Union has agreed to three on-site inspections should suspicious indications of underground testing be discovered by the detection system of the United States and the United Kingdom, and is willing to permit a number of automatic seismic stations on Soviet territory." (ENDC/85, p.3)

That being so, those nine United States scientists stress the additional character of on-site inspections and expressly acknowledge that the three inspections accepted by the Soviet Union constitute an additional assurance.

"... surely these eminent, reputable and well known American scientists, each with competence in his field, are worthy of belief".

Those are not my words; they are the words of Senator Clark, who, at the sitting of the United States Senate on 9 April 1963, asked that the paper drawn up by the nine scientists be put on the record.

Also at that sitting, Senator Humphrey, referring to the same document, stated:

"It represents a well-thought-out, constructive, and sensible statement by a group of eminent scientists in support of a nuclear test ban treaty. Signed by nine leading physicists and experts in other branches of science, the statement takes on added significance, because these are men of no partisan persuasion in particular, but are rather men of competence, excellence and scholarship in the field of science, particularly as physicists. In little more than two columns of newsprint it provides us with a superb analysis of the advantages of a test ban agreement between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. The authors have approached the question from the only point of view that has any lasting relevance to the Senate. They have argued almost exclusively from the point of view of United States national security and national interest. It is a very convincing argument indeed".

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Later Senator Humphrey stated:

"Mr. President, I consider this statement in this morning's press to be very timely, significant and meaningful in terms of our national security and the national interest. I hope that it will be studied meticulously and thoughtfully by every person in the United States, and indeed throughout the world, who is interested in world peace".

I should like to add that, also on 9 April 1963, in the United States House of Representatives, Mr. Robert W. Kastenmeier, representative for the State of Wisconsin, and Mr. William Pitts Ryan, representative for the State of New York, asked that the statement of the nine United States scientists be put on the record.

I think it could help members of our Committee if the United States delegation were to ask the Secretariat to circulate that statement of the nine United States scientists as a Conference document. ^{1/} The complete text has been published in the Congressional Record of 9 April 1963, page 5669.

I would mention that, according to a report published in the Swiss newspaper Tribune de Lausanne of 16 April 1963, one of the nine scientists, Dr. David Inglis, chief physicist of the National Laboratories in Argonne, Illinois, who once contributed to the perfecting of the first atomic bomb, stated in addition at a Press conference in Chicago:

(continued in French)

"... that the Soviet proposals for the cessation of nuclear tests were perfectly acceptable and that the number of three annual inspections on Soviet territory appeared to him to be sufficient. All nuclear explosions of any importance, he said, can be detected by stations located outside the borders of the countries where they occur. As for small explosions, they are of no military significance, because there is nothing they could teach countries trying to improve their nuclear armaments."

(continued in English)

Those words of Dr. David Inglis are extremely clear and constitute a precise indication that among United States scientists who have a sense of civic responsibility the idea has been penetrating ever more deeply that it is possible to conclude the treaty on the basis of the well-known conditions, without endangering any of the parties.

^{1/} subsequently issued as document ENDC/85.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

There is still another area in which it seems that we agree. In this Committee the socialist delegations have repeatedly stressed that between the risk of a treaty violation escaping detection, and the certitude of the nefarious consequences for mankind as a whole -- and for every separate nation, including the United States and its allies -- of the continuation of the tests, we can choose only the first, which is of a purely hypothetical nature.

Our point of view is shared too by the other party. Here, for instance, is what Mr. Humphrey said in the United States Senate on 7 March 1963:

"As to the danger of secret undetected testing, it is the consensus of expert opinion that the risk -- while it is there -- is small, and that in any case it is extremely unlikely that the results of cheating could have an important effect on the military balance of power. The controlling consideration must be an objective weighing of the risks of a treaty against those of unrestricted testing. On the basis of available evidence, the balance is heavily in favour of a treaty ...". (ENDC/82*, p.5)

To the same effect, Mr. Foster, the leader of the United States delegation, told us on 17 September 1962:

"Even though any test ban would entail some risk of cheating by the Soviet Union, we believe that risk is outweighed by the dangers to our security resulting from a continuation of unlimited testing."

I think I need not point out that if there is any danger of cheating it does not come from the Soviet Union.

But above any apprehension, real or imaginary, let us bear in mind permanently the real danger so accurately pictured in the following words of United States Senator Church, spoken on 11 March 1963:

"We are like passengers on a train that is headed toward a terrible precipice, and we know the bridge is out, and yet, we are arguing with one another as to what the dangers are in jumping off the train without taking into account what the inevitable end result will be if we continue on the tracks."

I have brought several facts before the Committee in an effort to substantiate the idea put forward at the beginning of my statement today, namely that our negotiations have yielded certain results, inasmuch as the correct theses set forth here had to be acknowledged also by those who had contested them.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Here I feel it is necessary to say that that does not mean that the Western side has made any concessions, or has met the Eastern side halfway. We are confronted with an acknowledgement of realities and truth, and not with concessions. One cannot make concessions to truth and reality.

I have brought these facts forward for another purpose, too: I wanted to draw the attention of this Committee to a paradoxical situation. Our negotiations have clarified the general principles upon which the test ban treaty is to be built. The authorized representatives of the executive and legislative power in the United States and the authoritative representatives of the scientific world and of public opinion of the United States -- as well as of other Western countries -- have acknowledged the accuracy of these principles, have removed numerous differences by their recent statements, and have opened up possibilities of removing the differences which remain. Notwithstanding that, and in spite of the statements by the most authoritative political and scientific persons in the United States, the United States delegation to this Conference keeps sticking to its old position, a rigid position, a position which is not borne out by any reality.

What conclusions are we to draw from that paradoxical state of affairs? Are we to conclude that the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing? Are we to conclude that words are one thing, and the facts here quite another? Are we to conclude that, both by words and by deeds, some try to gain time while speeding up their military preparations to the utmost; to gain time in order to carry into effect the proposals made by General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, and by General David Shoup, Commander of the United States Marine Corps, who have recently asked that the United States should produce a 100-megaton nuclear bomb?

Those are questions which every logical mind asks itself. They are questions which the United States delegation must answer. We should like the answers of the representative of the United States to be such as to permit us to ask immediately another question: On what day of April or May will this Committee be in a position to discuss, article by article, a test ban treaty drawn up on the basis of the realistic viewpoints now acknowledged not only by the leading political bodies of the United States, but also by prominent United States scientists?

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

In the speech to which I have already referred, Senator Church drew attention to the fact that the train is heading towards a tremendous precipice. With this I agree. I do not agree with Senator Church when he proposes the alternative of jumping off the train. We are in a situation when there is no need to choose such an alternative. Nobody is asking us to risk a jump off the train. We must unite our forces and, with a steady hand, hold up the train which is madly heading for the abyss. We are not mere passengers, scared, impotent and bewildered. We must give proof of calm, force and resolve.

I should like my statement today to be regarded as an additional effort by the Romanian delegation to smoothe the way towards understanding; an expression of our unflinching desire to see the end of the nuclear weapon race at the earliest possible date; and an embodiment of our resolve to insist unceasingly, in accordance with instructions from the Government of the Romanian People's Republic, on the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and -- as an important step towards that goal -- on the banning of nuclear weapon tests in all environments and for all time.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): This morning my delegation wishes to deal with the question of what progress we have made in this Conference towards a test ban treaty and, most importantly, what remains to be done.

Since March 1962 both sides have modified their positions in what have clearly been attempts to meet in some degree the position of the other side. The Soviet Union reaccepted the principle of obligatory on-site inspection, which it had abandoned on 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11; GEN/DNT/122). It also accepted again (ENDC/PV.119, p.22) the figures for the number of on-site inspections which it had proposed on 26 July 1960 (GEN/DNT/PV.234, p.15). We have welcomed both of those moves as moves which have helped us in our progress towards a test ban treaty, in spite of the fact that they do not represent real forward movement over what the Soviet Union proposed three and four years ago.

In a similar effort to reach agreement the United Kingdom and the United States, as the representative of Romania has reminded us this morning, have accepted the use of national systems for the detection of seismic events. In addition, on the issue

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

of on-site inspection, the United States and the United Kingdom have revealed the results of the extensive research programme which they have undertaken -- results which show certain important improvements in detection and identification. On the basis of those results the United States and the United Kingdom have reduced their requirements for the number of on-site inspections from twelve to twenty inspections annually to from eight to ten inspections annually.

In the session of the Conference, beginning in February 1963, we have additionally proposed to reduce our requirement on the inspection quota to seven inspections annually. We have made clear as well our position on the arrangements which should govern the conduct of on-site inspections. Those arrangements were set out in the memorandum (ENDC/78) submitted to the Conference by the United States and the United Kingdom on 1 April 1963.

Finally, the United States and the United Kingdom have made it clear that they are willing to negotiate on major issues. They have not presented demands about how we should proceed or upon what specific substantive positions must be accepted in total if we are to reach an agreement.

Where do we now stand in the Conference as a result of the efforts which have been made over the past year and a few months, and which I have just described? Speaking with the utmost frankness, I must say that it is clear that we have reached an impasse -- that we are clearly not in agreement now about how we must proceed with the settlement of a number of problems.

The basic issue has involved the question of inspection. There is, apparently, agreement that the question of inspection is the most important to be settled, although the Soviet representative has insisted on calling inspection merely "an additional guarantee" (ENDC/PV.119, p.22) to national detection systems to ensure the observance of a test ban treaty.

Here I should like to refer parenthetically to the statement which was just made by the representative of Romania, because he seemed to support the Soviet position that on-site inspections were merely an additional guarantee. He quoted (supra, p. 9) a statement from a letter dated 9 April 1963 and signed by a number of United States scientists, in which they did use the phrase "additional assurances" with regard to on-site inspection. The quotation comes in a section of the scientists' letter beginning:

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

"What assurances do we have that in the event of a test ban treaty the Soviet Union would not conduct underground tests?" (ENDC/85, p.3)

The scientists go on to say that, even though a small test might be concealed, they believe a significant series of tests might be almost impossible to conceal from detection. They state that they believe that the Soviet Union would not accept the risk of detection of such tests for what they call "the marginal gain" which it might derive from explosions small enough to escape detection. They then state, as the representative of Romania has quoted:

"We have additional assurances" -- that the Soviet Union would not undertake small underground nuclear weapon tests -- "in the fact that the Soviet Union has agreed to three on-site inspections should suspicious indications of underground testing be discovered by the detection system of the United States and the United Kingdom, and is willing to permit a number of automatic seismic stations on Soviet territory." (ibid.)

I think it is clear from that quotation, and from the context, that those scientists still believe that inspections are an integral element of a test ban treaty. They describe them as assurances additional to other logical reasons which they believe lead them to the conclusion that the Soviet Union would not try to cheat. Their statement means, of course, that no State which had accepted the idea of on-site inspections could expect to agree to a treaty and then hope to cheat with complete immunity. I do not believe that the United States scientists are, as the Romanian representative contends, endorsing the Soviet position on the number of on-site inspections. Rather, they take the Soviet act of accepting on-site inspections as that of a State which would not try to cheat by conducting clandestine underground nuclear tests.

In the interests of making clear the full meaning of the scientists' letter, my delegation will be quite happy to submit a copy to the Conference and ask the Secretariat to circulate it as a Conference document, as the Romanian representative has suggested.

In any case, it is clear that the Soviet delegation, as well as the Western delegations, are convinced that on-site inspection is the major outstanding issue. However, in spite of the apparent agreement on tackling the question of on-site inspection first, we find ourselves in disagreement about how we should proceed. We have been told by the Soviet representative that we must accept the Soviet delegation's procedural proposals on what aspect of inspection we are to discuss next.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The position of the Soviet representative, as I have made clear, and as he has made clear on numerous occasions, is that we must talk about numbers of inspections, and numbers alone, before we can proceed to discuss any other important issues of inspection in the Conference.

The United States and United Kingdom, on the other hand, began this session of the Conference by stating their interest in discussing the arrangements which will determine whether any number of inspections would be really effective. We believed, and we still believe, that in the absence of a discussion of these arrangements any judgement on the number of inspections would not be really meaningful. Unless certain of the broad issues were resolved, numbers of inspections would be merely abstract figures. We still believe that the best way of proceeding would be the way we propose.

Nevertheless, we expressed the view in the Conference that perhaps there might be parallel discussions on these subjects -- arrangements and numbers -- either in the plenary Conference or in the test ban Sub-Committee. That view was apparently supported by a large number of delegations here. It is a view which we believe represents a fair and reasonable compromise between the two positions. It is a view which we have urged the Soviet representative to accept. Therefore, while there is now an impasse on how to proceed with the negotiation of a nuclear test ban treaty, a realistic compromise proposal has been suggested and supported, and it remains only for the Soviet Union to agree so that we can get on with the task.

Where do we stand on the problems of substance?

Leaving aside for a moment the fact that there are a number of important questions to be settled concerning the numbers of automatic seismic stations and the organization and operation of a detection system, which would have to be discussed at some point in the future, we wish to concentrate for today on the inspection issue.

The Soviet Union has said that we must agree to one substantive position, and one alone, before we can make progress in the Conference. That position involves the number of on-site inspections. Specifically we are told that we must agree to three such inspections if we are to reach agreement on a treaty.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

On the other hand, the United States and the United Kingdom have shown a continuing willingness for serious negotiation on this question within the framework of agreed inspection arrangements. We have made our position on the problem of numbers of on-site inspections completely clear. We have said that under certain conditions we can accept a number of on-site inspections as low as seven. We have said also that that number -- and indeed any other number -- would be meaningless if we did not know something about the arrangements for the conduct of such inspections.

In addition to having made clear our position on the numbers of on-site inspections, we have proposed certain essential principles to govern the conduct of an inspection. We have stated our views on how events might be designated for inspection, and what criteria should govern such designation. We have indicated a method by which we believe events should be selected for inspection. We have made proposals on the composition of on-site inspection teams. We have stated in some detail our views on how inspection should proceed and on what measures should be taken by each side for ensuring the security of its own country in the course of an inspection of its territory. The Soviet Union has not, within the last year and one-half, made clear its views on any of those basic issues. That is another important impasse which we now face. A delegation which does not make its views known, particularly on the basic questions which it has admitted must be agreed on before a treaty can be reached, is not, we submit, giving evidence of a serious approach to the question of negotiating a nuclear test ban.

We believe that our proposals on the subject are fair and equitable. Nevertheless, we are willing to listen to anything which the Soviet representative might reasonably propose to change or to modify what we have put forward in a way which would help us to reach agreement.

Where do we go from here? We must, first of all, settle the question of procedure. The answer to that question, like the answer to most of the past questions in this Conference, must be a solution reached on the basis of flexibility shown on both sides. The United States and the United Kingdom have made it clear that they would prefer to discuss the problem of what a meaningful inspection really is before even tentative agreement on the number of inspections in the quota. We think that that is a reasonable position. Nevertheless, we have shown ourselves flexible by indicating our willingness to engage in parallel discussion of these two issues. We earnestly urge the Soviet representative to match this note of flexibility.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Next, on the substantive positions of the two sides, it is clear that we shall have to reach agreement on both the problem of arrangements for on-site inspection and the problem of the numbers of inspections in the annual quota. On the numbers of inspections, we are not far apart; but it seems senseless to my delegation to pull numbers of inspections out of thin air and agree to them if we do not know at the same time what an inspection is, and what it will accomplish.

On the problem of arrangements, the gap between the two sides may be larger or smaller, depending to a large extent upon the position the Soviet Union eventually chooses to take and make known. Let us be clear about it now however. The Soviet Union cannot expect to agree to an effective test ban treaty without discussing these questions at some point. It has given no convincing reasons why it should not discuss them now. We, for our part, have made it clear that the Soviet answers to many of our questions about on-site inspection arrangements could be merely "Yes" or "No", with no extensive debate or discussion.

For example, we know what the Soviet position was before 28 November 1961 on the question of the criteria which should be written into the treaty for the identification of earthquakes. It was identical to the position which we are proposing now. That issue could, therefore, be quickly settled with but one or two short words from the Soviet representative. Indeed, if the Soviet representative had only deprived himself of the luxury of one of the countless paragraphs he has delivered to the Conference in recent months about the West wishing to engage the Committee in a morass of technical detail, and had talked for just a moment about that particular issue, we might well have found that we could record immediate agreement on it.

There are other issues on which the Soviet delegation, and other Soviet bloc delegations, have assured us it will not be difficult to reach agreement. Let them come forward then with their positions on those subjects so that we may have a clearer idea of where we stand, and we can then get on with the job of reaching agreement.

On 17 April the representative of India made a proposal which might aid in the solution of our problem of how to proceed with the negotiation of a nuclear test ban treaty. Admittedly, he made the proposal in different context, but we believe what he said is significant. He told us:

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

"We should like to say to our colleagues that we must all try to look at the questions that are raised by any delegation. It is quite possible that the representative of the Soviet Union does not consider that the questions raised by the United Kingdom representative are extremely important. Let us concede that. He does not consider them important. On the other hand, the United Kingdom does consider them important. Therefore, we should hope that, in a certain spirit of give and take, it would be possible for delegations, even when they do not themselves regard a particular issue as of great significance, to deal with it if other delegations do regard it as an issue of importance. In that way we can clear obstacles from our path."

(ENDC/PV.121, p.28)

My delegation believes that that was reasonable advice. We have tried to follow it in our work in the Conference. Delegations will recall that on 18 February (ENDC/PV.99, pp.9 et seq.) the representative of the United Arab Republic raised a number of interesting questions, to which my delegation gave replies (ENDC/PV.100, pp. 6 et seq.). We shall be interested to hear the replies of other delegations.

We ourselves have raised a number of questions which we consider important and to which, unfortunately, the Soviet Union representative has never given a reply. Perhaps the procedure of question and answer would help us break out of the impasse in which we now find ourselves. Certainly it would be preferable to dredging up old arguments and quotations out of context in order to try to prove things about the position of the other side which are patently not in accord with its stated position.

We have much work to do if we are to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty. A number of proposals have been made and a number of questions have been asked on various aspects of the position of the negotiating States. We urge the Soviet representative to consider seriously the ways we have proposed to move our Conference forward again in its work on a test ban treaty. To begin real negotiations again would require no more than a statement of the position of the Soviet Government on the issues before us. We earnestly hope that such a statement will be forthcoming. We might then be able to answer immediately a question raised this morning by the representative of Romania, who asked,

"On what day of April or May will this Committee be in a position to discuss, article by article, a test ban treaty...?" (supra, p. 12).

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

And we say that we could begin immediately discussing, article by article, a test ban treaty if the Soviet Union would make clear its position on the important issues in such a treaty.

Mr. CAVALLETTE (Italy) (translation from French): First I should like to say how very interested I was this morning to hear Mr. Macovescu state "that our efforts have not been altogether in vain." (supra, p. 5) I am very happy to agree with him, and I note with satisfaction that the feelings of confidence and reasonable hope which I ventured to express before the Committee at recent meetings are shared by other delegations, including some of the delegations from the socialist countries. It is also a pleasure for me to quote Mr. Blusztajn's reference to my statement of 19 April. He said:

"I fully share his [the Italian representative's] feeling that we should not be discouraged by the dilatory pace of our work; and I also hope with him that we shall soon be making progress." (ENDC/PV.122, p.15)

Unfortunately, I found no such encouraging touches in the statement made by the Soviet Union representative at our meeting of 8 April on the prohibition of tests. I have re-read it very carefully and it calls, I think, for some comment from my delegation.

The Soviet Union representative's main endeavour at our meeting on 8 April was to show that an agreement on the prohibition of tests is impossible because the United States and United Kingdom Governments would be firmly opposed to it.

Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"The absence of agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is not, of course, the result of any differences on questions of control. ... Everyone realizes perfectly well that the negotiations for an agreement have been blocked over a period of many years and are still in a state of deadlock today solely for political reasons. We have spoken a good deal about those reasons. I am referring to the policy of the Western Powers aimed at continuing the armaments race and intensifying military operations". (ENDC/PV.119, p.23).

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Thus, according to the Soviet delegation, the proposals on nuclear tests submitted to the Conference by the delegations of the Western nuclear countries are in substance merely tricks or pretexts to mask the true Western game, that is to say, opposition to any agreement.

Incidentally, one "proof" of this Western attitude recently put forward by the delegations of the socialist countries is a speech (ENDC/82*) made in Washington on 7 March by an eminent and influential United States Senator. Well, I am happy that the Committee has had an opportunity to read the speech in full, because it was really a vigorous and important plea for an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests. And I personally find it surprising that the delegations of the socialist countries, in their efforts to falsify the true and profound significance of this speech, should have chosen to present it to us as confirming the bad faith of the United States and proving the soundness of the Soviet argument.

Furthermore, the Soviet argument, as it clearly emerges from Mr. Tsarapkin's statement at our meeting on 8 April, is that the United States and its allies intend to continue and even to intensify the armaments race because of their aggressive intentions towards peaceful peoples. The United States in particular is taking "feverish measures" -- these are the words used by Mr. Tsarapkin (ENDC/PV.119, p.24) -- to proliferate nuclear weapons, which they want to give to Federal Germany to back its plans for revenge.

I have summarized Mr. Tsarapkin's statement, which is very long; but I think I have -- unfortunately -- correctly interpreted his views. The Soviet representative's conclusion was that in the circumstances, it would be senseless to think that the United States and the United Kingdom want to conclude an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests.

This is the classical type of reasoning by false syllogism. The method is well known. You first make a false premise and then you reach a conclusion perfectly compatible with the premise, which is apparently true but in fact completely false. The false syllogism here is immediately obvious: the United States and its allies are preparing aggression; therefore they are opposed to an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

This is not, I think, the sort of reasoning to forward negotiations for a treaty. The sole aim of such reasoning seems to be to try to discredit the Western countries, to make them appear as warmongers and to draw down upon them general condemnation and hatred. In other words, it seems designed to serve evil and dangerous propaganda purposes.

Needless to say, if that was really the Soviet delegation's aim, its efforts are quite in vain. World public opinion is too responsible and too alert to let itself be easily deceived. It will not be easy to convince it that four more inspections per year would endanger the military secrets of the Soviet Union.

But I do not want to press that point at present. Rather should I like to emphasize how different is the Western attitude in this discussion. The statement which Mr. Stelle made this morning is a further proof.

The west avoids indulging in offensive or slanderous polemics which might divert the discussion and cloud the issue. We merely regret and condemn the Soviet delegation's inflexibility on both the substance of the question and methods and procedures. My delegation -- like the other Western delegations, I believe -- has never maintained that the Soviet Union is opposed in principle to an agreement. I have personally repeated several times my hope that the contrary is true.

We are, of course, bound to stress that the Soviet Union seems to envisage an agreement only on its own conditions -- conditions tabled as an ultimatum. We are bound to emphasize that the Soviet delegation refuses to discuss its own proposals or any other suggestion in a concrete manner. In fact, the Italian delegation has often asked the Soviet delegation what dangers it sees in inspections based on the procedures proposed by the United States delegation. The Italian delegation has even suggested that the first step should be to study the safeguards that might eliminate the danger of espionage feared by the Soviet delegation.

On the Western side, the delegations of the nuclear countries have, with patience and goodwill, made every effort to explain their reasons for proposing a certain number of inspections. They have diligently tried to convince the Soviet delegation of the soundness of their request.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The Soviet delegation has so far not seen fit to take this trouble with regard to its own proposals. It has carried the argument into our camp and tried to confute our assertions by using false interpretations of articles in the Western Press or tendentiously presented statements by Western personalities. The Soviet delegation has always refused to explain why it wishes to limit inspections to three, except by repeating its argument about a supposed misunderstanding, which really no longer holds water. Instead of giving us the explanations needed, the Soviet delegation has opposed the convening of the nuclear sub-Committee and has preferred at plenary meetings to indulge in protracted and barren polemics based on general policy, neglecting no device to arrive at the conclusion that the West was resolved in any event to refuse to conclude any agreement, so that any effort at conciliation was useless.

I should like to point out that if the Soviet Union were really convinced that these are the intentions of the West, Soviet diplomacy, which is very skilful, would make a very easy game of them. The Soviet Union would in fact have a very effective means of exposing to the whole world the premeditated ill-will of the Western Powers. It would only have to accept the proposals we have put forward; the Machiavellian game of the Western Powers would be unmasked immediately. If it were true that the West is opposed in principle to any treaty on the prohibition of tests and is aiming at the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we should be greatly embarrassed by Soviet acceptance of the proposals we have put forward. At that point the criminal designs of the West would be obvious to everyone. The Soviet delegation would have fully achieved what seems to be its present objective, namely, to denounce the NATO countries' dangerous and aggressive intrigues to the world. I said, Mr. Chairman, "seems to be its present objective"; but I very sincerely hope that it is not, even though the Soviet delegation sometimes gets carried away by its love of polemics and its desire to make propaganda.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I hope that no one here has set himself the primary or sole aim of making baseless charges against the other partners in these negotiations. We are not here to revive the baleful atmosphere of the "cold war", which has for so long infested the world and from some of whose effects we are still suffering. The purpose of our presence here is quite the opposite. In fact, Mr. Chairman, our function is to negotiate unceasingly on anything that may improve the prospects for world peace. We are here to seek points of contact, in all sectors, but particularly as regards nuclear tests, on which agreement is more urgent than ever. The West is always ready and anxious to negotiate seriously, in good faith, with patience and understanding. We ask the Soviet delegation to do the same and to refrain from poisoning the atmosphere of the Conference with offensive and unrealistic comments based on misinterpretation of Western policy. We ask it to participate with us, and with the delegations of the non-aligned countries, in genuine and serious negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear tests.

I am heartened by the words just spoken by our colleague from Romania at the end of his statement. I am sure that they are sincere, and I hope that the sincerity of his desire to reach an agreement --- which is certainly our desire --- is shared by all the delegations of the socialist countries.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation shares with profound sympathy the concern shown by most members of our Committee at the state of the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests. The negotiations on this question are in fact in an impasse, at a standstill.

Nevertheless, many arguments have been advanced which show that, from the point of view of strengthening peace, there is no doubt about the expediency, necessity and urgency of concluding an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. Nor is there any doubt about the possibility of effective control over the observance of such a treaty from the scientific and technical standpoint.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It is generally known that the Soviet Union deems it necessary to conclude an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests as soon as possible. In the United States, in a certain section of responsible political circles, there appears to be a trend in favour of concluding an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We hope that it is in this sense, apparently, that we should interpret the statement made by the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, at a press conference on 22 March when he pointed out the consequences which might ensue as a result of the lack of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. President Kennedy said: "By 1970, unless we are successful, there may be ten nuclear Powers instead of four, and by 1975, fifteen or twenty".

The President went on to emphasize:

"I see the possibility in the 1970's of the President of the United States having to face a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard."

As to the possibility of observation to make sure that a treaty on the cessation of tests is being strictly carried out, it is well known that the national means of detection possessed by States are fully adequate for control over the observance of a treaty. At present this is not only the standpoint of the Soviet Union, but in the United States of America and in the United Kingdom a good many responsible political leaders are in agreement with it. In the United States of America, even in official government circles the conclusion has already been reached that national means of detection, national systems, would be adequate for detecting and identifying nuclear explosions, in other words, for exercising control to make sure that there is no violation of an agreement. Thus, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, stated on 11 March before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee:

"The increase in our technical ability to detect seismic events at long distances permits us to rely upon seismic stations outside the Soviet Union to detect underground nuclear explosions inside the Soviet Union."

Mr. Rusk also admitted that the United States ability to detect violations of a nuclear test ban was, as he put it "better than can be revealed".

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

These words of Mr. Rusk show that the United States relies entirely on its own system to detect suspicious seismic events in the territory of the Soviet Union. This means that from the scientific and technical standpoint there is nothing to prevent the United States from agreeing to a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

One could adduce other statements by United States political leaders or recall the information given by Senator Humphrey in the United States Congress on 7 March concerning the great capabilities and phenomenal success of the United States detection system (ENDC/82,p.24).

In the light of these statements by responsible statesmen in the United States, the attempts of Mr. Stelle at the meeting on 8 April (ENDC/PV.119,pp.14 et seq.) to distort both the spirit and the sense of Senator Humphrey's statements on 7 March looked rather odd. Only one conclusion can be drawn from these statements, namely, that the number of inspections agreed to by the Soviet Union fully ensures on-site verification of highly suspicious seismic events in the territory of the Soviet Union. But it is not only Senator Humphrey's statements that matter. If, in regard to the possibility of detecting and identifying suspicious events, one were to adopt the obsolete position which Mr. Stelle is still advocating, one would have to repudiate other authoritative statements on this question.

After all, what Senator Humphrey stated was not his own personal conclusion but that of prominent United States scientists. The representative of Romania, Mr. Macovescu, has already referred this morning (supra, p.9) to a statement by a group of leading United States scientists published quite recently simultaneously in the Washington Post and the Congressional Record, on 9 April. This statement shows that there is at present every possibility for control over the cessation of nuclear tests. In their letter, the scientists confirm the fact that national systems of detecting nuclear explosions now constitute the basic means of control over nuclear explosions. Here is what the scientists have to say:

"It is now possible to detect many of the explosions within a given country by stations outside that country, and the number of on-site inspections required for checking the identification of earthquakes versus explosions has been greatly reduced. Research has also shown that there are many fewer earthquakes in the Soviet Union than was formerly thought, thus making a reduction in the possibility of their being confused with nuclear tests." (ENDC/85, p.2)

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Obviously these scientists do not regard on-site inspections and the establishment of automatic seismic stations as being the basic means of detection and regard them as additional assurances. In contrast with what we were told today by the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, this group of nine prominent United States scientists specially note in their letter the significance of the additional assurances offered by the Soviet Union when it agreed to two or three inspections and to three automatic seismic stations (ENDC/73, pp.3,5). This part of the United States scientists' letter is so important that I shall quote it. This is what the scientists say on this subject:

"We have additional assurances in the fact that the Soviet Union has agreed to three on-site inspections, should suspicious indications of underground testing be discovered by the detection system of the United States and the United Kingdom, and is willing to permit a number of automatic seismic stations on Soviet territory." (*ibid.*, p.3)

I draw your attention to the highly important fact that these United States scientists regard inspection and automatic seismic stations as additional assurances. This coincides with our point of view, but does not fit in at all with what Mr. Stelle has been saying here today. I draw your attention to the fact that in their statement the United States scientists do not question the adequacy, for the purposes or control, of the two to three inspections a year proposed by the Soviet Union. But Mr. Stelle, brushing aside what the scientists have written, continues, by making references to science, to dispute this figure and to insist on an increased number of inspections. We know that Mr. Stelle is not a scientist. In that case, if he refers to science, he ought to bear in mind the opinion of scientists, to take their opinion into account and not to ignore it; otherwise Mr. Stelle should stop making references to science and freely admit that, on the question of inspections, the United States takes a purely arbitrary position based not on scientific data but on the requirements of the United States intelligence agencies and of those who have no desire whatever for an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

The question of inspection will not be properly elucidated unless we pay attention to the fact that the technique of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions is constantly being improved, so that also United States scientists have

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been brought very close to recognizing that there is no need at all for on-site inspection. In this connexion I should like to draw your attention to a United Press International Agency report published in the New York Herald Tribune on 13 April.

This report states:

"University of Michigan scientists through a 'lucky coincidence' may have stumbled on to a way of telling the difference between earthquakes and underground nuclear tests."

This report says that Michigan University was using a mobile field station in California just at the moment when an earthquake and a nuclear explosion -- an American one, of course -- took place. The earthquake was a moderate one -- 4.0 on the Richter scale of magnitude -- and the nuclear blast was conducted underground at the Nevada test site.

A spokesman from Michigan University, David E. Willis, said that this lucky coincidence offered an unusual opportunity to compare the seismic waves of the two events. There was a rather striking difference. The nuclear explosion started with a large shockwave, followed by lesser shocks. But the earthquake was just the reverse -- smaller shocks leading up to a large one.

This statement by the spokesman of Michigan University once more confirms the complete feasibility of effectively identifying underground seismic events and of distinguishing natural earthquakes from nuclear explosions.

In the same article the New York Herald Tribune states that: "This could mean that the United States could detect underground tests by other nations without the need of on-site inspection." Note the words "without the need of on-site inspections". What does this mean? It means that people in the United States are at last beginning to come to the conclusion that there is no need for on-site inspection for control over an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

However, progress in the negotiations on the cessation of tests has for a long time been held up over the question of on-site inspection. So far the main obstacle to agreement has been the demand by the United States side for international control and inspection in respect of the cessation of underground nuclear tests. The United States and United Kingdom representatives have been urging the Soviet Union to agree

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to the principle of on-site inspection and to accept a small number of annual inspections on its territory. They named such figures as those which the Soviet Union has now accepted.

The Soviet Government agreed to certain international measures of control over the cessation of nuclear tests and it agreed to the carrying out of two to three inspections a year on the territory of each of the nuclear Powers.

The United States persistently tried to persuade us to agree to three inspections a year. This persuasion went on through official and unofficial channels. Unofficially, during private meetings we were asked about this by Mr. Arthur Dean at a time when he was still official United States representative at the negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and on disarmament. We were also asked the same thing by Prof. Wiesner, Adviser to the President of the United States, during his two unofficial conversations with Academician Fedorov. Officially, we heard this persuasion of the Soviet Union to agree to three inspections a year in a statement by the United States representative to the United Nations, Mr. Adlai Stevenson, when he spoke officially in the First Committee of the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/C.1/PV.1246, p.38-40). We were asked about the same thing in the official statements made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, who is present here today, and by Sir Michael Wright, who is no longer with us. We have no doubt whatever that at the time when the Soviet Union was firmly opposed altogether to inspection, the United States was ready to agree to three inspections. This is not a groundless assumption but a fact. I should like to remind the members of the Committee that the figure of three inspections a year also appeared in the United States draft treaty prepared before the Soviet Union agreed to two or three inspections a year.

Perhaps not everyone knows that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency headed by Mr. Foster prepared and submitted to the United States Congress and the United States President a report on its activities during 1962. This report included a United States draft treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Paragraph 8 of article VIII of this draft was worded as follows:

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"The maximum number of inspections which can be carried out on the territory under the jurisdiction or the control of a permanent member of the Commission" -- this is a reference to the International Scientific Commission, of course -- "is three per year."

I draw your attention to the phrase "three per year". The same wording of this same paragraph of article VIII appeared also in an illustrated pamphlet printed by the United States Publications Office in February last. Later, of course, officials of the State Department and the Agency bethought themselves and they changed paragraph 8 of article VIII leaving a blank space in place of the figure 3, but it was obvious to anyone who had read the document at the time that, until the Soviet Union agreed to three inspections a year and even for some time afterwards, the figure of three inspections a year appeared in the United States draft treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. However, no sooner did the Soviet Union, in the interests of achieving agreement, accept two to three inspections a year than the United States, considering that three inspections a year was already for them a captured position, started to reject the quota of three inspections and put forward fresh demands regarding the number of inspections. The United States representatives in the Committee are now trying to repudiate everyone and everything. They repudiate Arthur Dean, they repudiate Professor Wiesner, they repudiate Adlai Stevenson, they repudiate the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, they even repudiate the fact that the figure of three inspections was laid down in the previous version of their draft treaty on the prohibition of tests. Now they say that it was a misprint, that three lines had been omitted. But who will believe that?

The British, not daring to let themselves get out of step with the United States representatives, were compelled to deny their own statements. That is what Mr. Godber did regarding his own statement in November last year (ENDC/SC.I/PV.44, p.11), and at the same time he also denied what was stated by Sir Michael Wright on this subject at the beginning of December last year (ENDC/PV.87, p.8).

Of course, these were not bona fide denials but simply a withdrawal of their own words which, of course, have not ceased to exist, Mr. Godber, because they appear in the verbatim records of the relevant meetings of the Committee.

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All this in fact leads not only to a senseless delay in solving the question of the cessation of tests, but it even threatens the negotiations with a breakdown and is an attempt on the part of the United States to evade altogether the solution of the question of prohibiting nuclear weapon tests. The following facts are particularly eloquent confirmation of these intentions on the part of the United States:

1. The resumption by the United States of underground nuclear tests after 1 January 1963 in spite of the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/1762(XVII) -ENDC/63).
2. The continued testing of nuclear weapons by France, and
3. The feverish -- I am not afraid of repeating this word, Mr. Cavalletti -- the feverish measures of the Western Powers for the purpose of forming a NATO nuclear striking force in preparation for aggression.

It cannot be doubted that these actions on the part of the Western Powers mean an even greater intensification of their military preparations. These actions of the Western Powers only lead to a further intensification of the nuclear arms race with all its disastrous consequences.

We have already spoken of the negative influence exerted upon the negotiations for the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests by people from the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission and by the gentlemen of the so-called United States "military-industrial complex", those merchants of death whose interests require that nuclear tests should go on, that the nuclear arms race should grow in scale. For the mighty United States military concerns it holds out the promise of further colossal profits, further enrichment. The worse the relations among States, the greater the danger of a world thermonuclear conflict, the more secure, the more stable, becomes their source of immense profit. Therefore the opponents of the cessation of tests in United States official bodies, connected by visible and invisible links with the merchants of death, are using every means to raise obstacles to the solution of the problem of nuclear weapon tests, not excluding deliberate misinformation of the public concerning the possibility of control over the observance of an agreement on the cessation of tests. In this connexion I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to a letter published in the New York Times of 11 April by the former United States representative at the negotiations on disarmament

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and the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, Mr. James Wadsworth, who is well known to us all. In this letter he described very well the methods used in preparing reports on the question of the cessation of tests for presentation to the public. The aim of these reports was to prove that there was no machinery for detecting nuclear explosions in the territory of the Soviet Union. This statement by Mr. Wadsworth ties up with and coincides with what Senator Humphrey said on this subject in the Senate on 7 March (ENDC/82). Describing the reports prepared by the group of Republican members of the House of Representatives headed by Mr. Hosmer, Mr. Wadsworth states that the first of these reports was based on the opinions of "experts whose anti-test ban views were already well known." Mr. Wadsworth went on to say:

"Anyone seriously interested in the facts could hardly be in a position to judge the detection machinery without hearing from the men most closely associated with making it work."

As an example of the actions of Congressman Hosmer we might refer to the fact that at the meeting of the United States Joint Atomic Energy Commission on 5 March he insisted that the statement by the seismologist Dr. Ruina, the director of research into detection of underground nuclear tests, be deleted from the record. It should be noted that Dr. Ruina did not say anything of a seditious nature. He merely ventured to express the opinion that even if someone wished to cheat and to carry out clandestine nuclear explosions, it would be very difficult for him to persuade himself to do so, knowing that the treaty provided for on-site inspection. Dr. Ruina stated that a violator of the treaty would inevitably be found out, particularly if he tried to carry out a series of explosions.

In his letter, Mr. Wadsworth calls the activities of the Hosmer Group "one of the most unfortunate domestic developments" since he was in Geneva as the leader of the United States delegation. Mr. Wadsworth's letter shows that the forces opposing the cessation of tests do not stop at any methods to prevent the achievement of an agreement.

The example given by Mr. Wadsworth of distortions in the drafting of various documents relating to the question of capability to detect nuclear explosions is not the only one of its kind. Particularly striking in this regard is the

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anti-scientific one-sidedness and even the special garbling of the data selected by the United States military authorities for publications on nuclear test ban questions. All this can no longer be concealed from the public. It has finally received international publicity. As an authoritative opinion expressed on this subject in the United States, I will refer to a statement made by Senator Clark in the Senate on 7 March. This is what he said:

"Not too many months ago President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned this country about the power of the military-industrial complex in our economy and in our political life. I think that warning was well justified. I share the concern of my friend" --- he was speaking of Senator Humphrey -- "that the industrial-military complex in this country is such an effective agent for promoting expenditures in the defence system, in the interest, really, of keeping the arms race going, that they blanket the press with propaganda that they want to give to the American public, in the interest of why we are for tests. The other position is not given to the American public, and we are led to believe, by columnist after columnist, by scientists, even by Senators, that those who seek a test ban treaty, seek something that is dangerous to our security, and that no patriotic American would dare to stand up for an agreement." (ENDC/82, p.25)

United States scientists themselves tell us of these distortions of facts, particularly the group of United States scientists to whose statement we have referred. Here is what these distinguished United States scientists have to say about those who oppose a treaty on the cessation of tests -- I quote from a letter written by the scientists:

"Among the most flagrant violations of fact which they have publicized in these matters are the recent statements by Dr. Edward Teller that a test ban agreement 'would be virtually unpoliced'." (ENDC/85, p.2)

This statement by United States scientists is indeed remarkable and speaks for itself.

The United States atomic scientists have also pointed out how the facts have been distorted by Senator Dodd who is one of the most fanatical opponents of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

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We should like somehow to summarize and get the full meaning of the facts we have adduced, by looking at them as a whole rather than piecemeal. As the only reason, with which the United States covers up its refusal to come to an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests, it points to the alleged difficulty of distinguishing between underground nuclear explosions and natural earthquakes.

But these difficulties are imaginary, hypothetical or even intentionally fabricated in the United States itself. There are a whole number of questions, the answers to which reveal the real reasons why the United States is avoiding an agreement. I shall take the liberty of putting these questions.

Who has the undoubted monopoly in carrying out underground nuclear tests? I reply: the United States. After all, almost 100 per cent of the underground nuclear explosions are carried out by the United States. Therefore, if anyone should fear that someone would start carrying out secret nuclear explosions after the conclusion of an agreement, it is certainly not the United States.

Where are statements made that the physicists working on armaments are on the threshold of new and decisive discoveries in the field of nuclear weapons, and that the prohibition of tests would hinder the making of these discoveries? These statements are made in the United States of America.

Where are statements made that for the sake of the idea of military balance it is necessary to set about developing a hundred-megaton nuclear bomb, and that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests would prevent the implementation of this programme? These statements are made in the United States of America.

Where are statements made that there is already in existence a programme for carrying out nuclear test explosions not only in 1963 but also in 1964 and for many years ahead? This programme has been worked out and is being implemented in the United States of America.

Where are statements made that the continuance of nuclear weapon tests is necessary for the creation of a neutron bomb and other types of nuclear weapons, or in order to make a cheaper nuclear explosive? These statements are made also in the United States of America.

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Where is it that opponents of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests have attempted to hamper the development of more effective methods and means of detecting nuclear explosions? I reply: in the United States. This is shown by many facts in the life of the United States over the past five years. However, I shall only refer to one of the most recent pieces of evidence. In the report of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1962 the following statement is made: "... So far no nuclear test has been authorized exclusively for the Vela Uniform Research Programme". This was the programme (ENDC/45) which according to official statements of the United States Government was intended to improve methods and means of detecting nuclear explosions.

Major General Betts, who heads the sub-section of the Atomic Energy Commission concerned with the military use of atomic energy, declared to the Commission on 7 March 1963:

"When underground nuclear weapons tests were resumed, it was necessary to re-organize our resources and efforts towards a full support of the weapon tests programme."

From this statement of General Betts it became known that the tests in the Vela Uniform series were reduced to those tests which could be carried out "in conjunction with underground nuclear weapon tests".

One would think that since the United States has the largest number of those who doubt the effectiveness of existing methods and means of control over nuclear explosions, it should be interested in improving these methods and means. But as can be seen from the report of the Atomic Energy Commission for 1962 and from Major General Betts' statement, the United States shows no interest in this problem. And no wonder, since the whole business of detecting nuclear tests has been farmed out to the manufacturers of nuclear weapons themselves, or to their customers. I should like to go on putting questions.

Where is it that the efforts of a certain group of scientists working for the Defense Department have been concentrated on working out the theory and practice of concealing nuclear explosions, that is muffling, decoupling, and so on? I reply: in the United States.

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Where are statements made that progress in the "technique of deception" has outstripped progress in the "technique of detecting" nuclear explosions, and that it is therefore impossible to establish effective control over the cessation of tests, without which, it is alleged, there can be no agreement on the prohibition of tests? In the United States.

Where is it that only specially prepared data are selected for publication, which mention fabricated, imaginary, far-fetched and hypothetical difficulties of control over nuclear explosions and hide from the public the "phenomenal" progress in the sphere of detecting underground nuclear explosions? In the United States.

Everything likely to help towards achieving agreement on disarmament, or at least on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, is labelled "secret" in the United States, and lies gasping for fresh air in the strong boxes of the United States Defense Department. And whenever anything happens nevertheless to find its way into the light, then the action taken is very simple -- the official representatives of the Western countries either deny such data or, before the eyes of the whole world, repudiate their own words without so much as a blush.

If we collate all these facts, and reflect on this whole complex of negative efforts, falsifications, misinformation and so forth, no one will be left in the slightest doubt with regard to the true causes of the impasse and the lack of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

How, then, in the light of the statements and facts we have adduced, are we to understand Sir Paul Mason's appeal to stimulate a freer exchange of opinions on the problems connected with the cessation of nuclear tests? Can it really be that free exchange of opinions means freedom to distort the facts, to misinform public opinion, and to help towards intensifying the preparations for nuclear war? In our opinion this is false freedom. We are opposed to such "freedom of opinion", for which the United Kingdom representative appeals, which leads to a complete divorce from reality and brings the world nearer to a nuclear conflict. The whole Western Press, and in particular the United States Press, recently laid great stress on the fact that the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests has become, so to speak, an issue in the inter-Party pre-electoral struggle in the United States. Of course, the inter-Party pre-electoral struggle in the United States is a purely internal matter for that country, and we do not intend to deal with it. But we cannot be

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

indifferent to the way in which this fact is exerting such a negative influence on the position of the United States delegation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and, as a consequence, on the results of the work of the Committee as a whole. We have to note with regret that, as a result of all this, it is the interests of the peoples of the whole world that suffer, the interests of those who are anxiously awaiting an agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear tests.

In general, there has come about in the Committee, as a result of the position adopted by the Western Powers, a situation which may be characterized as an impasse; and, as you see, it is by no means a matter of technical or administrative details which the United States delegation so insistently wishes to discuss. The controversy which the United States delegation is carrying on in regard to these questions is merely a pretence; it is a means to cover up the reluctance of the United States to agree to a nuclear test ban. The situation in regard to our negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is very little different from the situation which existed, for example, a year ago: just as it did then, the United States is also now stubbornly insisting on the question of inspection and thus blocking the achievement of an agreement.

In this connexion we cannot help recalling the words of the United States columnist, Lippman, who said that the opponents of a test ban treaty in the United States "do not want nuclear tests to come to an end". It is in this that we must seek the key to understanding the United States position in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The obstacle to the achievement of an agreement does not at all lie in technology, as the United States representatives mechanically try to make out, but only in the political position of the United States which does not desire such an agreement. It is on the United States alone that a solution to the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests depends.

Concern has been expressed here about the difficulties of trying to find a compromise solution. But at present it is not at all a question of trying to find some new compromise. A compromise proposal already exists. It has been put forward by the Soviet Union. The gist of the compromise proposal is as follows: national detection systems as the basis of an agreement, two or three inspections a year, and three automatic seismic stations on the territory of each of the nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The Soviet Union insists on solving without delay the question of the inspection quota and the question of the number of automatic seismic stations these being the basic questions standing in the way of an agreement. There is no justification for the United States continuing to avoid a solution to these questions. The representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, has again today tried to involve the Committee in technical discussions on the question of inspection without agreement on the quota of inspections proposed by the Soviet Union. This statement of his shows that the United States is continuing its policy of preparing for war, and that the obstruction on the part of the Western Powers in the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is only one of the points which eloquently confirm what I have been saying.

Now that the objective facts relating to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests have come to light and received wide publicity in the United States, the United States delegation no longer has any arguments, and even less any moral or political grounds, which could in the slightest degree justify or cover with a veil of plausibility the position which it is taking today, which is unrealistic and has long been at variance with the situation existing today. Now everything has been completely exposed: no subterfuges will help; they will not delude anyone. We must reach agreement on the mutually acceptable realistic basis which has finally taken shape. I repeat it: control to be based on national detection systems plus, as an additional guarantee, two to three inspections a year and three automatic seismic stations on the territory of each of the nuclear Powers.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I still have on my list of speakers the names of the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United Arab Republic, but I have also received a request from the United States delegation for an immediate right of reply. I think the practice in the Committee has been for representatives to be called upon to speak in the order in which they have signified their desire to do so. However, if the Committee had no objection I should be prepared to accord the right of reply to the representative of the United States. I therefore ask the Committee, and particularly the delegations whose names have already been inscribed, whether there would be any objection to the right of reply being given to the United States immediately.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): As the next speaker on the list I would say that, on the assumption that the United States intervention would be a very short one, I should have no objection.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): As there are no objections I call upon the representative of the United States.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I wish to thank the speakers whose names were on the list for allowing me the opportunity to reply immediately.

The statement which the Soviet representative has just made was replete with inaccuracies, but in order not to trespass on the courtesy of the delegations which are inscribed I shall deal with only one. Mr. Tsarapkin has frequently tried to make the case that the United States, officially or unofficially, had given the Soviet Union indications that the number of three on-site inspections a year would be acceptable to the United States. Those statements of the Soviet Union have been refuted, on the record, and I need not refute them again now.

Today, however, the Soviet representative went to extravagant lengths -- or rather perhaps, sank to absurd depths -- in trying to say that in the official text of the draft treaty which was presented by the United States and the United Kingdom the United States has specified the number of three on-site inspections a year, and that it only later changed that to a blank when the Soviet Union re-accepted on-site inspections and put forward a suggested quota of three a year. The facts are known to the Soviet representative but, since he has attempted to mislead the Committee, let me present them.

On 27 August 1962 the United Kingdom and the United States of America introduced into this Committee a draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments. That draft treaty is before the Committee as document ENDC/58. Paragraph 8 of article VIII of the English text of that draft treaty reads as follows:

"The maximum number of inspections which may be requested in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a permanent member of the Commission shall be _____ in each annual period. The maximum number of inspections which may be directed in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a Party not a permanent member of the Commission shall be three in each annual period, or such higher number as the Commission, after consultation with the Party, may determine by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting." (ENDC/58, page 9).

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The draft, which is available to all representatives as a Conference document, left blank the number of on-site inspections which might be requested in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a permanent member of the commission. That was dated 27 August 1962. On 28 January 1963 Mr. Foster reported to the President of the United States and submitted a second annual report concerning the activities of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. That report was printed and was submitted to Congress on 4 February 1963 by President Kennedy in a document, to which Mr. Tsarapkin referred this morning. In that report there was a typographical error. On page 91 of that report, which was printed in February 1963, article VIII reads, as Mr. Tsarepkin quoted it this morning (supra, p. 30):

"The maximum number of inspections which may be requested in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a permanent member of the Commission shall be . . ."

then, through the typographical error two lines were omitted, so that it read --

"shall be three in each annual period . . ."

The documents are available to the members of the Committee. I would not take the time of the Committee to lay the facts before it, but it seems to me that the Soviet representative, in using this as a serious argument and in trying to use as proof a typographical error printed some months after a formal document had been presented here, is indulging in a kind of balderdash which wastes the time of the Committee. Further, it seems to me that this type of argument reflects on the general merit of the argumentation used to establish a case which is untenable.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): In view of the hour, I shall be very brief. I wish to make just one or two points.

Having listened to the speech by the Soviet representative this morning, I would say that he has come very near to treating this Committee with contempt. I have never heard a speech that was more completely unconstructive, so full of inaccuracies and at times -- by its repetition of matters which had previously been argued out and whose relevance had been adequately weighed by the representatives around this table -- so unnecessary. I am very sorry indeed that he took three quarters of an hour of the Committee's time for such an unconstructive and unnecessary speech. Indeed, after listening to the speech of the representative of Italy this morning I could not help wondering

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whether -- though I am sure this was not so -- there had been some collusion between Italy and the Soviet Union in regard to their statements, so accurately did the Italian representative surmise the speech that was likely to follow. When listening to the Italian representative I thought he was giving a very stern reminder to the representative of the Soviet Union of the need for serious negotiation. How well merited that reminder was, for the speech we have just heard from the Soviet representative helps us in no possible degree and hinders us a great deal. I am sorry to have to say that, but it is absolutely true and it is necessary to say it.

I am not going to weary the Committee with a further repetition of my own comments on charges that have been made against me and my former colleague, Sir Michael Wright, concerning things we have said both here and in the United Nations. I have already rejected absolutely the charge that we had misled the Committee and misled the Soviet Union. I would refer to what I said on 15 February 1963 (ENDC/PV.98, pp.44, 45) when I went into this matter in some detail, referred to the quotations and showed the completely unjustified nature of the charges raised; and again on 1 March 1963 (ENDC/PV.104, p.34) when I dealt with subsequent charges. I hope we shall hear no more of them but, if we do, I shall certainly be forced to go into this in much greater detail. It shows, of course, the complete paucity of the Soviet Union's case that it has to keep rekindling up these old charges in order to avoid the embarrassment of being drawn into serious negotiation. That is the saddest aspect of the speech to which we listened a short time ago.

I thought it quite extraordinary how accurately our Italian colleague said earlier this morning (supra, p. 21) that so frequently the Soviet Union picks on a false premise and from it draws a wholly inaccurate deduction. How very accurate he was in saying that, for only a few moments later our Soviet colleague said, in regard to detection capability, that it was known that national detection systems were completely adequate both to detect and to identify (supra, p. 25). He went on almost immediately to quote Mr. Rusk, the United States Secretary of State, speaking on the effectiveness of detection, which he had said was better than could be revealed -- the effectiveness of detection, but not the effectiveness of identification or of location. Our Soviet colleague knows perfectly well the difference between detection, location and identification. Why, therefore, does he seek to mislead us on these matters? He knows perfectly well that Mr. Rusk was talking about detection at that time. Yet he seeks to muddle these things in our minds. I submit that that is not helpful in any sense at

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

We all know the advances that have been made in detection. We all know that certain advances have been made in location and in identification. But we in the West do not know, and cannot agree, that sufficient advance has been made in identification to eliminate the need for on-site inspection. When Mr. Tsarapkin brings up case after case and quotation after quotation from Western spokesmen -- not official spokesmen, but unofficial spokesmen and columnists -- it really does not help at all. I would remind him, as I have reminded him before, that some of the Soviet Union's own scientists, who normally have to be extremely careful about what they say on these matters, did at the Pugwash conference last autumn substantially agree that there was in fact a continuing need for on-site inspection because identification capabilities were not complete.

There have been further meetings of scientists since. I know of nothing emanating from such meetings to indicate that Soviet scientists have changed their minds. There is still that gap, and it is no good pretending it does not exist. If the Soviet Union is really interested in getting at the facts it has only to agree to an official meeting of scientists here in Geneva, or elsewhere if it wishes, where these points can be thrashed out and finalized.

I say, therefore, that the repetition of those misleading statements does not help us in the least. It is quite clear, of course, that we are in an impasse. That is the one thing on which we are agreed. Our Soviet colleague used the word today (supra, p. 24); our United States colleague used the word today (supra, p. 14); and we have to find a way to break out of it.

On the question of numbers it must be quite evident that our Soviet colleague is under instructions to avoid any serious negotiation, just as it must be quite clear that the Western representatives came back here after Christmas trying to make progress. We did advance our position, and if only we could get some response it might be possible for us to make progress. But if the Soviet Union is resolved to refuse to make progress in negotiation and discussion on this issue then why does it say that it is the only issue it will discuss? That is the nonsense of the present position. Our Soviet colleagues say, "We can make no move from our position at all. We will discuss nothing else but this particular position."

When the Soviet representative ended his speech just now by saying (supra, p. 38) that we must have a mutually acceptable solution, and that that mutually acceptable solution must be on the basis of three on-site inspections, he was really testing us in

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

a most absurd way. A mutually acceptable thing is a thing which is mutually agreed -- mutually negotiated -- and not dictated from one side. So, if our Soviet colleagues cannot make any move at the present time on this question of numbers, then I ask them why they do not agree to discuss the other matters, on which they themselves have said it should be possible to reach agreement. Is it that they are determined to frustrate agreement? Otherwise, why will they not discuss these other modalities of inspection with us in detail so that we may know where we stand and whether, in fact, the positions on these issues are as close as the Soviet Union would have us believe? If we could eliminate those items altogether it would help us, I believe, in finalizing our total position.

So, instead of having these long polemical speeches, which serve only to exacerbate and not to bring us together, I would say to our Soviet colleague: Do let us have serious discussion and serious negotiation on matters on which there is an element of doubt in relation to the Soviet position, while we still await anxiously some evidence that the Soviet Union is willing to discuss numbers with us in a more realistic attitude.

There is just one further point I want to make, as another indication of our difficulties in getting an accurate assessment of the points that confront us. Our Soviet colleague told us a very few moments ago that the United States had a virtual monopoly of underground testing. He said (supra, p. 34) that almost 100 per cent of underground tests had taken place in the United States. How do we know that to be a fact? How can we know it to be a fact? The Soviet Union admitted last Spring, after the event, one underground test which took place on Soviet territory on 10 February 1962. It did not admit it until some time after it had happened. How do we know that it has not carried out a number of further tests since then? What evidence have we to let us know that? What right has the Soviet Union to tell us, without giving us any evidence or allowing any opportunity for knowledge, that in fact there have been none? We need proof. And that is why we need facilities for on-site inspection. It is as simple as that. What we need is proof, just as we need agreement on the degree of knowledge about identification. We need agreement on the modalities of a test ban, and we need also, finally, to get agreement on figures.

All those things, I believe, are possible if we have the right spirit, but the right spirit is not encouraged by statements such as that which we heard from the Soviet representative this morning.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): My delegation takes part in the debate today with some diffidence and after no small amount of hesitation, for we have come to the conclusion that whatever we may say will have no effect on the course of events as long as some here do not intend to move ahead.

The fact that today's meeting has failed to produce any new element, and that all the speakers have tended to repeat themselves, has perhaps convinced us of the necessity for this intervention. We speak today in deference to the response by the two main parties to the concern voiced by some of the non-aligned delegations, and in deference particularly to the appeals -- for which we are thankful -- made by the representative of Italy and the representative of the Soviet Union at our one hundred and twenty-second meeting.

It is in that spirit that we once again voice our conviction that agreement on a test ban is possible and practicable even today, and even although it may be long overdue. It is true that test ban negotiations have extended over many long years, and have had their ups and downs. Small wonder then that the number of sceptics, of those who see only the difficulties on the road to a test ban and of those who have come to have second thoughts about the basic sincerity of purpose of the negotiating parties, has consequently increased.

On the other hand, and despite the United States five underground tests since the beginning of 1963, which we have regretted and continue to regret, there are many indications which point to the existence today of other important factors, technical, military, economic and even political, which should have weighed very heavily in favour of the nuclear Powers wanting to reach a settlement, once they decided that the time for a test ban had come.

I shall not tax the patience of the Committee by reviewing those constructive factors, which are already too well-known to the nuclear Powers themselves, for apparently facts today may be scientifically valuable and technically important but have no bearing on the political realities as the nuclear Powers see them. Nevertheless, it remains true that technically, if not politically, the positions of the nuclear Powers on the possibility of a safe, satisfactory and adequately controlled test ban have never been closer than at present.

It may be relevant and useful, therefore, to remind the Committee of what my delegation had to say on the subject two months ago. On 18 February I said:

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

"It is an absolute necessity that both parties should close this small, final gap. A mutually satisfactory accommodation would, and indeed should, be reached if the parties started negotiating in earnest and if they really felt the need to agree on a test ban, which was the impression given by the letters which were exchanged." (ENDC/PV.99, p.14)

I said also:

"We are convinced that only the nuclear partners -- and possibly only at the highest level -- can find solutions ... which they will be ready and willing to implement. We do not tend to underestimate the real difficulties which they may still encounter. ... They have to do more with confidence -- or the lack of confidence -- and with national prestige." (ibid., p.16)

And I went on to appeal to the nuclear Powers in these words:

"Rather than capitalize on what seem to be points of weakness in the position of the other party, each should try to understand and sympathize with the difficulties of the other." (ibid., p.17)

Finally, I said:

"My Government believes that no positive agreement between equally great Powers can be based on anything but a position of equality in honour." (ibid.)

Unfortunately the last two months have proved only that those problems having to do with confidence, faith and national prestige were too hard for the nuclear Powers to solve by themselves. Therefore, the non-aligned delegations in this Committee thought that they could not very well stand idly by and watch the foundering of the ship of negotiations on the rocks of prestige and mutual fears.

In line with the charter which the non-aligned delegations had set for themselves for their own mission at this Conference, the United Arab Republic delegation -- not being wedded to any particular formula from East or West, and having no immediate interest of its own other than the success of our negotiations -- saw it to be its duty to exert its utmost efforts in order to seek both honourable and constructive compromise possibilities which might contribute to setting the ship of negotiations on its right course and to starting its machinery running again.

On 20 March 1962 the representative of Sweden outlined before this Committee what the Swedish Government envisaged to be the role of the conciliator between the two great Powers at this Conference. Because of their great interest and timeliness I am going to quote his relevant words. He said:

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

"... bilateral negotiations are necessary between the great Powers ... A stalemate could, however, occur in these negotiations. This may increase tension and invite or compel the Governments of the great Powers to move in a direction inconsistent with the hopes and aspirations of a majority of mankind. Under such circumstances other members of this Committee may feel obliged to put forward proposals or compromises of their own in order to fulfil their obligations according to the mandate." (ENDC/PV.5, p.20)

He went on to say:

"I do not imply that these other delegations should shoulder the responsibility of submitting a complete draft treaty of their own. But perhaps it would be possible for a number of delegations to agree upon certain specific recommendations, especially those that hold out hope of serving as a basis for compromise, even though they may not have been acceptable previously to either of the great Powers." (ibid., pp.20 and 21)

Because of the great esteem of my delegation for the representative of Sweden's judgement and sincerity of purpose, and because of our full agreement with his outline of policy, my delegation, on 18 February (ENDC/PV.99, pp.7 et seq.), thought it consistent with its afore-mentioned obligations in fulfilment of its mission and mandate to declare its opinion unhesitatingly and unswervingly on what it believes to be right and just, even though, to use the words of the representative of Sweden, it "may not have been acceptable previously to either of the great Powers."

Worthy of note also is the fact that on 15 February 1963 (ENDC/PV.98, p.47) the United Kingdom representative had expressly invited the representatives of the non-aligned States to try their hand once again at a compromise solution.

Let me now briefly review the nature of my delegation's first compromise attempt, because of its continued appropriateness and close relationship with subsequent attempts and with the present situation. We asked the nuclear Powers:

"... is not the acceptance of two or three inspections per year tantamount to admitting that they can be made consistent with a State's national security ...? Could it not prove possible ... to accept for example a maximum of four to five visits under the same security arrangements? And, conversely, does not the acceptance of the theory and principle of inspection of only a fraction, let us say one-fifth, of unidentified events ... amount

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

in fact to tacitly admitting that the acceptance of one-seventh or one-eighth of unidentified events, let us suppose five or four visits, should not very much affect the general picture of a few surprise-deterrent visits?" (ENDC/PV.99, p.13)

We asked also:

"Does it not follow ... provided one party has the assurance that the visits will not be used for illegitimate activities, and that the other party is satisfied that the number of visits will truly have ... the desired effective deterrent value, that the number of visits becomes just a symbol devoid of any charm or magic?" (ibid., p.14)

And we went on to ask whether there was anything especially significant or sacred, politically or scientifically, about either figure suggested by East or West.

It would now appear that even as far back as 18 February my delegation ventured to draw attention not only to what seemed to be the right and just quota figure of four or five visits but also to a solution of the procedural difficulty, when we said:

"The different proposals about the quota number could be discussed prior to and simultaneously with other pertinent components of a draft test ban treaty." (ibid., p.15)

It is a well-known secret in the Committee that other non-aligned delegations did subsequently envisage and favour what amounted actually to the same approach in their appraisal of the possibilities of a concentrated or concerted non-aligned attempt at a compromise. On 18 February we expressed the opinion that:

"The non-aligned States should not find it beyond their resourcefulness to come forward with various suggestions." (ibid.)

Underlying this thought was our belief, also expressed on 18 February, that possibly

"... the detached and non-committed approach, by its very nature, is more capable of seeking compromise solutions which might ultimately turn out to be acceptable, even though they might look far-fetched or too ambitious at the time." (ibid.)

It was on that understanding that, during the ensuing two months, the non-aligned delegations tried their hand -- and possibly went too far in revealing their hand prematurely -- at a compromise. My delegation's conviction of the usefulness and appropriateness of such a concerted endeavour stemmed from two considerations, namely, that the other delegations shared that conviction, and that it was largely consistent

with the beliefs and thoughts which my delegation had voiced on 18 February and which had gained wide support from members of the Committee even outside the non-aligned delegations.

It is worthy of mention that on 20 February 1963 (ENDC/PV.100, pp. 6 et seq.) the United States representative came very close to accepting our line of thinking about the quota figure compromise which we had indicated on 18 February. He also accepted any of the alternative procedures suggested by my delegation on that day for dealing with the quota figure in relation to the modalities of inspection.

The rest is common knowledge to the Committee. Despite the wide support which those non-aligned thoughts and suggestions had gained in the Committee, and after the non-aligned delegations had translated them into a common endeavour but before they had had a chance to table them, certain delegations expressed their dissatisfaction with, and even opposition to, the same proposals and ideas. But although some delegations may have changed their minds about that non-aligned endeavour, my delegation, and I am sure many others, remain convinced of the basic wisdom and sincerity of purpose of the Swedish representative's statement, to which I have referred, that some other delegations may feel obliged to put forward proposals in order to fulfil their obligations according to the mandate, even though they may not have been acceptable previously to either of the great Powers.

As a non-aligned delegation to this Committee we find ourselves faced with two alternative possible ways and means of fulfilling our mandate as we see it.

The first alternative might entail the recognition that, as we said on 18 February last,

"... only the nuclear partners — and possibly only at the highest level — can find solutions to those problems, solutions which they will be ready and willing to implement." (ENDC/PV.99, p.16)

Recognition of that, however, did not prevent my delegation from fulfilling its duty as it saw it by reviewing and pointing to the possible areas of honourable compromise. That was in our view a necessary step, even if it fell short of tabling and submitting our thoughts officially to the Conference. In that connexion we said:

"We are not submitting any of these illustrations, however, because we do not feel they could be useful in the absence of the political will of one and all to reach a quick settlement." (ibid.)

As an insight it would appear that my delegation's fears about the absence of political will unfortunately turned out to be true, and if my delegation has found it useful to

remind the Committee today of its previous compromise suggestions because it believes they are still timely and relevant, let me point out that we are not submitting them officially today because we do not believe that there exists enough readiness and willingness to accept the non-aligned delegations' attempts at compromise, or the political will to reach a quick settlement. All we can say at this juncture is that, as we see it, the elements of an honourable and equitable settlement of the test ban issue are all present, and that the nuclear Powers indeed know full well the wishes and aspirations of the world as well as the broad lines of possible compromise solutions and honourable face-saving formulas which the non-aligned delegations in the Committee have already worked out during the last two months, but have not presented officially in deference to the wishes of the nuclear Powers.

We can do one thing more, namely, wish them luck and god-speed in their bilateral contacts and hope that they will be able to prove their sincerity of purpose to a thoroughly anxious and increasingly sceptical world.

The second alternative begins to offer itself to the non-aligned delegations as they become more convinced that their silence and inactivity, instead of helping the cause of negotiation, may become more and more harmful and less and less consistent with their mission at this Conference and with their United Nations mandate. That is precisely the alternative which was envisaged by the representative of Sweden in his statement which I have already quoted. Faced with the grim prospect of watching the foundering of the ship of our negotiation, as I pointed out earlier, the non-aligned delegations may be compelled to conclude that their silence and inactivity might be mistaken for collusion with or consent to the nuclear Powers moving, as the representative of Sweden put it, "in a direction inconsistent with the hopes and aspirations of a majority of mankind." (ENDC/PV.5, P.20)

I should like to invoke in this connexion the very pertinent words of the representative of the Soviet Union, which are strongly reminiscent of the reasons and the feeling behind the second alternative course to which I have referred. On 19 April he said:

"But silence is no argument for rejecting these proposals." (ENDC/PV.122, p.34) He went on to insist that the other delegations should discuss the proposal made by the Soviet Union. Then he said:

"We are ready to listen to and study attentively any possible amendments or additions to these Soviet proposals; but we strongly condemn attempts to pass over these proposals of ours in silence." (ibid.)

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

By the same token, would it not be understandable and fair if some of the non-aligned delegations expressed at some future stage their dissatisfaction with and protest against any attempt to pass over their proposals in silence or, worse still, to stand in the way of their presenting such proposals and honourable compromises in fulfilment of their mandate and their mission as they see them?

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I now call upon the representative of the Soviet Union, who wishes to exercise the right of reply.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I shall be very brief. First of all I should like to reply to the representative of the United States. The United States representative, Mr. Stelle, in fact refuted nothing; he only confirmed what I said. At first he tried to deny flatly the facts I adduced, but when he appealed to the document, everyone saw that Tsarapkin spoke the truth, and he himself admitted the correctness of what we quoted, namely, that the draft treaty included the figure of three inspections a year.

As another equally "convincing" argument the United States representative referred to the August draft treaty (ENDC/58) prepared by the United States. But this reference could not convince anyone either. Mr. Stelle himself began his statement today by saying (supra, p. 13) that moves and substantial changes have recently taken place in the positions of both countries, the United States and the Soviet Union. In this connexion one might think that the appearance of the figure of three inspections a year in subsequent versions of the draft treaty submitted to the President of the United States was a confirmation of those substantial changes in the United States position, which Mr. Stelle mentioned today. We, of course, were very disappointed to learn that he himself does not regard it in that way. Well, what else can be said about Mr. Stelle's statement today? He used some rather harsh and unflattering epithets in my regard. I put this down to the extreme irritation of the United States representative and in this connexion I can only recall the well-known saying of the Romans: "Jupiter, you are angry -- therefore you are wrong".

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

I now come to Mr. Godber. First, I should like to say that Mr. Godber tried to catch the Soviet representative in inaccuracies or perhaps even distortions of certain generally known scientific facts. What displeased Mr. Godber particularly was the fact that I gave a quotation (supra, p. 25) from a statement made by the Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, himself, which shows quite clearly that the United States possesses instruments and methods for the detection of nuclear explosions which enable it to cope easily with the task of exercising control over nuclear explosions carried out by the other side, without having to resort to the organization of a system of international control posts on the territory of the other side. Mr. Godber brought down his wrath upon me and accused me of failing to distinguish two things; he said that "detection" is not the same thing as "identification". But here I must tell you, Mr. Godber, that when experts --- physicists and seismologists -- meet they use in their own terminology two terms: "detection" and "identification". But when political leaders and diplomats deal with this question, it has become the custom --- and you yourself, Mr. Godber, having been doing so --- that in speaking of the detection of nuclear explosions we understand detection and identification as being the same thing. As a matter of fact, what does it mean to detect a nuclear explosion? When anyone says that he has detected a nuclear explosion, this already means that the event has been identified. It cannot be understood otherwise. I should like to quote once again the words of Mr. Rusk:

"The increase in our technical ability to detect seismic events at long distances permits us to rely upon seismic stations outside the Soviet Union to detect underground nuclear explosions inside the Soviet Union".

What is meant by "to detect underground nuclear explosions"? To detect a nuclear explosion means the same as to identify an event, otherwise you would not say that you had detected an underground nuclear explosion, but you would say that you had detected some kind of "seismic event", the nature of which was unknown --- whether it was a nuclear explosion or a natural earthquake. But when we say that an underground nuclear explosion has been detected, this already includes the concept of identification. That is the only way everybody understands this question, Mr. Godber.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Now one more question. Mr. Godber said that we need serious negotiation. I apologize for the harshness, but to us this talk about serious negotiation is nothing but "empty words", having no real meaning if we have no agreement on the inspection quota or on the number of automatic seismic stations. This is now the crux of the matter. This is preventing any further progress. As soon as the United States removes this obstacle, we shall be able to plunge into those technical details which you want us to consider. Therefore, when you say that we need real negotiation and at the same time avoid reaching agreement on the question of the number of inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations, it is perfectly clear that your remarks were made merely for one simple purpose -- just to say something at least in reply to the Soviet representative. But this cannot convince anyone of anything.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I call on the United States representative, who wishes to exercise the right of reply.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I shall be very brief indeed. When it was pointed out to the Soviet representative that, as I am sure he knew all along, it was ridiculous to waste the time of the Committee in claiming, by using a typographical error, that the original United States position was that there should be three on-site inspections and that we changed it later to a blank number of on-site inspections, and when it was pointed out to him also that the draft treaty tabled on 27 August 1962 (ENDC/58) preceded the typographical error which was made in 1963, he immediately changed his ground. He said that the 1963 booklet appeared later and that there have therefore been changes in the United States position. That, of course, is flatly contrary to his original argument. But, just to deal with the second argument, I should point out that the purely typographical nature of the error is made clear by the fact that on page 84 of the booklet the heading of the text in question is "Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in all Environments, 27 August 1962".

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and twenty-third meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Burns, representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, the United States, Italy, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Republic.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday 24 April 1963 at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

